Introduction to the Problematique
Grossly simplified, one could apply two traditional perspectives to EU public law: A constitutional and an administrative perspective. These two can be used as examples to highlight two different aspects of EU integration through law. Looking at EU law from a perspective of administrative law, one might conclude that it contains procedural approaches for the integration of initially organizationally separate actors in order to achieve the goals of EU policies. [2007] , 253-271. Pressing questions arising from that perspective are thus very much oriented towards achieving transparency of procedures, accountability of actors and allocation of responsibilities within nonhierarchic networks. An administrative perspective highlights that procedural cooperation has in many instances intensified so much that new actors were created. Comitology committees evolved out of a set of procedural rules for supervision of the Commission exercising implementing tasks. Informal networks of executive bodies became formalised to formal networks with decision-making powers and cooperate procedures, which then in many policy areas evolve to agencies.
perspective, on the other hand, highlights questions more from a perspective of rules of conflict to define the relations between the EU and Member States as well as between the EU and international organisations. This results from rules on distribution of competences and from principles established to solve competence conflicts. There is of course a lively debate about the appropriate use of conflicts rules such as hierarchies of norms, pluralist models or deliberative-supranationalist models.
The results of the constitutional and the administrative perspectives on EU public law could be discussed separately. A joint approach might on the other hand, allow taking into account that European integration has been based not only of establishing a legal order which was supplanted onto Member State law by means of constitutional conflicts rules such as supremacy and direct effect. It would allow acknowledging that it is equally is based on a system that actively integrates
Member States in a system of joint exercise of public powers. Integration, one might argue with neofunctionalist approaches was successful because it combined a system of conflicts rules with an increasing degree of procedural integration. 3 These latter theories assume that Member States were capable of accepting such new legal order to which they had delegated sovereignty because they were actively part of the exercise of these powers. This was not completely alien to their domestic legal systems. Instead of constituting a loss of sovereignty as consequence of delegation, the Community constituted a gain for the Member States by being able to participate in the creation of policies which would be applicable throughout the Community. Integrated executives from this point of view have emerged from the fundamental needs of the Member States to link national and European administrations in order to maximise their problem solving capacity. The success of integration has been ascribed to the fact that pure intergovernmental structures would not be capable of addressing the joint regulatory problems of a market as integrated as the EU's. A federal structure, on the other hand, would threaten the very existence of the EU member states by establishing heavy hierarchic structures which the member states may not be prepared to support. The evolutionary development of the integrated executive structure was an alternative to that choice. 4 The tool to achieve this goal was to achieve a high degree of integration of the executive powers of the Member States into
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The end of the traditional 'binary' approach (distinguishing for internal matters national public law from international public law as the law of contracts between states), is of course not only a phenomenon of European integration. Networks of governmental executives with private party participation for regulation and information sharing exist in many policy areas beyond European integration from banking and finance regulation, over environmental protection and other fields of Common interest. The result of such networking has been referred to as the 'disaggregation of sovereignity' and the 'disaggregated state'. Agenda setting, for example, despite being a prerogative of the Commission, is characterised by a high degree of cooperation and consultation of national executives. These in reality play a central role in shaping the Commission's policy initiatives. The forum in which this cooperation takes place are expert groups which are generally composed of national civil servants as well as independent experts.
These groups are used to develop and test ideas, build coalitions of experts and pre-determine policy incentives to be formally presented later by the Commission as initiative. They are arenas for deliberation, brainstorming and intergovernmental conflict solving and coalition building. 5
Similarly, supranational and national administrative actors exercise influence over the EU's decisionmaking process. The presence of the national administrations is felt mostly within the Council working parties that support COREPER. Here, the national civil servants have to balance their national mandate against the need to reach a consensus in pursuance of EU tasks.
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The most obvious arena for intensive administrative cooperation and interaction, however, is the implementation phase. EU administrative governance in the policy phase of implementation forms an essential part of the exercise of public power in the EU. A wide variety of activities pursued by the institutions qualify as implementation -they range from single case decisions and preparatory acts thereof to acts of administrative rule-making and the amendment of specific provisions in legislation where so authorised. A wealth of structures to take implementation decisions and forms of implementation measures have been developed in different policy areas. Amongst these are forms of governance by committees (through 'Comitology'-type and the newer 'Lamfalussy'-type procedures), governance by agencies, governance by administrative networks as well as implementation by private parties acting as recipients of delegation. These forms of implementation structures are not mutually exclusive. Most policies use several of these structures in combination. The current constitutional framework in the EU and EC treaties only partially reflects the evolutionary development of EU This organisational gap leads also to an 'accountability gap.' The latter gap arises due to different degrees of integration between what in a traditional separation of powers system would be referred to as the legislative, executive and judicial powers. On the European level, the high degree of integration of executive powers is often not matched by an equal level of integration of legislative and judicial powers. This leads to imbalances and problems with supervision and control of the executive. It is a consequence which has been deplored with respect to Member States executives becoming more powerful vis-à-vis their national parliaments due to the possibility of escaping political accountability at home by engaging in EU level rule-making. 35 This problem has been addressed by strengthening of the EP and effective judicial control of EU law in the ECJ. However,
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Cite 11/70 Köster und aus ELJ Topology article discussion of using institutional practice for arguing in favour of amending Treaty provisions.
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At the origin of this word-play seems to be Deirdre Curtin with various publications e.g. This has consequences not only for our understanding of the role of the EU/EC and the Member States in Europe but also for the analysis of key aspects such as accountability of exercising public powers in Europe. The latter aspect is the key challenge arising from this integration. The question therefore is whether, in view of the evolution of integrated executives, forms of accountability have equally been created. It is not a given that the accountability structures would automatically appear in comparable time and speed. Not least because the highly integrated network system has been developed in a non-coordinated approach through experimentalist approaches pioneered in individual policy areas.
The challenges EU public law faces is to align various options of ex ante and ex post modes of control and supervision from executive, parliamentary and judicial forms to allow for both transparent and effective exercise of public powers. 36
Integrated Executives
A more in-depth look at accountability structures for integrated executives action in formal and informal both legislative and administrative-type activities confirms this gap. The actors belonging to the European or Member State executives acting in the networks are inter alia subject to a system of checks and balances from within the integrated executive. Such forms include, hierarchical and nonhierarchical arrangements. 'Internal' supervision of executive activities from within the executive networks can be divided into a number of areas of focus. 37 They take into account various multilevel, network and composite elements and their associated complexities and include:
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Above, in the chapter re-thinking the challenges arising from administrative law, it was found that accountability can be considered from three different perspectives aligned to the classical separation of powers as executive supervision, political (parliamentary) supervision and judicial supervision.
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The complexity of these mechanisms is best illustrated by the in-depth discussion by G. and by means of the very rare Article 227 EC procedure;
• supervision internal to the administrations of the Member States within fields of EU action; supervision of sub-national and municipal authorities within the Member States e.g. in the area of public procurement and state aids but also the use of structural funds;
• supervision within composite procedures of input from other members of an administrative network.
• supervision of executive action by private parties involved in procedures, e.g. by lobbyists in legislative and rule-making procedures and e.g. complainants in single-case administrative procedures.
• supervision of executive action by the wider public through access to information possibilities.
Looking at this long yet necessarily only indicative list of options, it becomes apparent that executive supervision and control takes place in an integrated manner when it comes to executive functions generally undertaken in network structures. Challenges exist in respect to transparency and allocation of responsibility in networks.
This picture is quite different from parliamentary and judicial forms of supervision, which may illustrates the accountability gap. That gap arises from the difference between these intricate network control and supervision structures of integrated executives in comparison to the possibilities of a two-level set-up of parliamentary and judicial control and supervision structures. • Also provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon is the possibility of Article 12 TEU, MS parliaments by review of compliance of legislative proposals with the principle of subsidiarity
Two-Level Parliaments
• European political parties, so far only marginally organised, could help to reinforce political networks also within parliaments.
• Informally the work of the EP's Ombudsman is supported by the activities of the national and regional ombudsmen in the Member States, organized in a 'European Network of Ombudsmen.' This serves to provide mutual support and exchange of views. The network was established in order to address potential lacunae in the Ombudsman's supervision of administrative activity. 40 The idea is to be able to transfer complaints between the European and the relevant national and regional ombudsmen. Thereby complaints should be automatically handled by the ombudsman in charge of the administration being the source of alleged maladministration. However, the strict organic distinction of competences also within the network of ombudsmen can lead to difficult situations in composite administrative procedures. To address these problems a special procedure was developed through which national or regional ombudsmen may ask for written answers to queries about EU law, its interpretation and its application to special cases from the EO. The EO either provides the answer directly or, if appropriate, channels the query to another EU
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For further reference to history and functioning of the COSAC see www.cosac.eu and from the literature e.g.: H. concerned with protection of fundamental rights in the Member States is permitted in accordance with the relevant national law.
This said however, the network characteristics of executive integration in the EU do not facilitate effective parliamentary supervision organised either on the Member State or on the European level.
The intense executive cooperation for the creation and implementation of law is a fast-paced activity, in which responsibilities are often distributed amongst many different actors.
Two-Level Judiciary
Judicial however is far from a simplification and might not make all that much of a difference in reality.
Looking at a systematisation of approaches and clarification of accountability mechanisms has often loosely be termed 'constitutionalisation.' 43 What is necessary in my view is to develop a 'network constitution' to address the different network integration problems. Such would not have to be a formal constitutional treaty or even a treaty amendment. A material constitution establishing rules and principles through case law, general principles and common accords for addressing real problems of a networked and integrated legal order might suffice. Such 'network constitution' will thus be specifically a process-oriented material constitution of the EU. In establishing these basic constitutional provisions, it is however necessary not stand paralysed and frozen in an outdated conceptional fiction of a two-level legal system in which powers and competences can be neatly of something which needs to be protected against encroachments from the 'outside'. Instead the search can be for the best political solution to a problem and the best procedural mix of actors involved for the task at hand. This will not be the end of separate actors such as the Member States.
It instead argues more for a lawyers' focus on framing conditions for transparency and accountability in joint and composite procedures created to realistically reach public goals for which joint action is necessary.
A network constitution as material constitution therefore does not replace the Treaties or in any way encroach on their scope of applicability. It would instead be a collection of concepts, rules and principles established to address network issues arising from the reality of the EU legal system. Some counter to the developments in reality of an ever more integrating legal system in the EU. The EU is thus in reality characterised by its multi-level cooperative structures, designed to include the different
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Two explanations seem plausible. First, the distinction between the two categories of act can be interpreted in view of the historic development as the result of a compromise between two schools of thought on the horizontal separation of powers between Community institutions which were represented within the convention leading to the Constitutional Treaty: One opinion held that the Commission as the prime EU executive body should play an eminent role in implementing and forming EU legislation. This approach would argue in favour of far reaching delegation to the Commission, which would have resulted in stronger 'regulatory' legitimisation of the Union. decision-making levels and generate knowledge in the administrative system prior to taking decisions. 45 Such considerations as to a network constitution might be well accompanied by establishing best practice approaches in EU administrative sphere. 46 So far in the reality of EU law, there is often a growing gap between the prolific creation of new forms of administrative action in the EU and their regulatory framework and embedding in various control and legitimacy mechanisms. EU legislation has been a true laboratory of experimental institutional and procedural design. This richness however has led to an overburdening complexity of often overlapping rules and principles. It can lead to a lack of transparency, predictability, intelligibility and trust in European administrative and regulatory procedures and their outcome. One of the key issues to be addressed in this context is the great potential but also need for simplification. A creation of a best-practice approach might thus serve to improve visibility, transparency, allocation of responsibility and accountability of administrative and more generally executive action in the EU.
These attempts should contribute to addressing the issue of public accountability. It seems important though to me to stress that such accountability can not be established by internal checks and balances within a system of integrated executives alone, as important as these internal structures may be. Also the parliamentary and party political aspects as well as the judicial aspects are important. On the European level, there is often not so much a deficit of democracy and representation of interests as a deficit of truly political debate. Politicising the policy choices made in the integrated legal system is an important part of parliamentary supervision and control of executive action in networks.
The review of EU public law both from what generally might be viewed as a constitutional and an administrative point of view therefore has shown us that in many cases first appearances in EU law might be false. An attempt to frame a legal system along constitutional understanding well familiar to a scholar of, for example, a federal constitutional model risks not creating legal structures adapted to addressing the challenges which the legal system of EU law. The challenge is to develop of network accountability by constitutionalising networks that fit the specific nature of the EU. That is defined by its nature of exercising shared sovereignty by integrated executives and the ensuing network character of an increasing amount of actors and procedures in policy areas. The normative challenge for lawyers in EU public law is to develop the transparency, accountability structures from all sides.
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See for further analysis of the developments of the past decades is further developed in H. 
